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POWER OF BANK TO SECURE PRIVATE DEPosITs BY PLEDGE OF ASSS
IN Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Smith 1 a national bank had pledged
bonds to secure the deposit of a private corporation. Upon the bank's
insolvency the depositor threatened to sell sufficient securities to pay two
checks, which represented the full amount of the deposit, and payment of
which had been refused by the receiver. The receiver by bill in equity
prayed for an order restraining such sale, which was granted, and the
bonds were ordered to be delivered to the receiver free of the lien. The
court held that the pledge was unlawful because the power of the bank to
make it, not being expressly granted by the National Banking Act, would
not be implied from the general grant "to exercise . . . all such incidental
powers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking . . . by
receiving deposits .... ,,2
There is a distinct split of authority as to whether a bank may pledge
its assets to secure deposits of public funds 3 in the absence of explicit
statutory authorization. 4 The instant case is the first involving the power
of a national bank to pledge assets to secure private deposits. Thero is
some authority affirming the existence of such power in state banks. In
'U. S. Daily, March 26, 1932, at 160 (C. C. A. 3d), aff'g 48 F. (2d) 861
(W. D. Pa. 1931).
213 STAT. 101, § 8 (1864), 12 U. S. C. § 24 (1926).
a The power was upheld in the following cases: Williams v. Hall, 30 Ariz.
581, 249 Pac. 755 (1926); Williams v. Earhart, 34 Ariz. 565, 273 Pac. 728
(1929); Richards v. Osceola Bank, 79 Iowa 707, 45 N. W. 294 (1890); In
re Bank of Spencerport, 255 N. Y. Supp. 482 (App. Div. 1932). Likewise
a pledge to indemnify a surety on a bond to secure public deposits has
been generally held valid. McFerson v. Nat. Surety Co., 72 Colo. 482, 212
Pac. 489 (1923); Page Trust Co. v. Rose, 192 N. C. 673, 135 S. 'E. 795
(1926) Grigsby v. People's Bank, 158 Tenn. 182, 11 S. W. (2d) 673 (1928),
The power was denied in the following cases: Arkansas-Louisiana Highway
Improvement Dist. v. Taylor, 177 Ark. 440, 6 S. W. (2d) 533 (1928);
Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. Citizens' Trust & Guaranty Co., 153 Xy.
566, 156 S. W. 160 (1916) (pledge to indemnify surety on bond for public
deposits); Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank v. Consolidated School Dis-
trict, 174 Minn. 286, 219 N. W. 163 (1928) ; Divide County v. Baird, 55 N. D.
45, 212 N. W. 236 (1927); Note (1930) 65 A. L. R. 1412.
4 For a collection of such statutes, and a discussion of their operation
and effect see Note (1931) 79 U. OF PA. L. REv. 608, 611. National banks
are expressly authorized to give security for public funds. 39 STAT. 121
(1916), 12 U. S. C. § 192 (1926). 13 STAT. 113, § 45 (1864), 12 U. S. C.
§ 90 (1926).
5 Ward v. Johnson, 95 Ill. 215 (1880) ; Ahl v. Rhoads, 84 Pa. 319 (1877)
(in these cases the transaction might well have been styled a "loan");
Ex pate District Grand Lodge, 147 S. C. 103, 144 S. E. 841 (1928);
Peurifoy v. Westminster Loan & Trust Co., 148 S. C. 100, 145 S. E. 706
(1928) (in these cases the validity of the pledge was apparently not raised
by counsel). See Smith v. Lansing, 22 N. Y. 521, 534 (1860).
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some states, however, a pledge of assets to secure private deposits is ex-
pressly prohibited by statute. But these statutes and the effect of the
instant decision may probably be avoided if the particular transaction can
be placed in the category of a "loan" to the bank, rather than a "deposit"
since it is conceded that the former may be validly secured by a pledge of
assets The virtual identity in legal effect between these two transactions
has appealed to some courts as persuasive reason for upholding a pledge
to secure a deposit.8 But the cases in which this analogy has been drawn
concern public, rather than private deposits, and in all of them the courts
have been motivated by a deep concern for the protection of public funds9
And a number of courts have vigorously rejected this analogy, even in
support of a pledge to secure public deposits, largely on the ground that as
a matter of banking practice they are dissimilar transactions.0
Since the general terms of the National Banking Act and of most state
statutes may as easily be construed as implying the power to secure private
deposits by a pledge of assets as not, the question largely resolves itself
into one of policy. While cogent reasons may exist for affording public
deposits the protection of a pledge, there seems to be no justification for
giving such a favored position to any private depositor. Such a pledge will
generally deprive other depositors of assets from which they should be
entitled to satisfy their claims upon the bank's becoming insolvent,"1 and
6 IDAHO LAWS (1925) c. 133, § 39; Porter v. Canyon County Farmers'
Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 45 Idaho 522, 263 Pac. 632 (1928); S. D. Courp.
LAws (1929) § 8984; Smith v. Continental State Bank, 11 F. (2d) 907
(D. Mlinn. 1925). UTAH Co MP. LAWS (1917) § 1006; N. D. Coup. LAWS
ANN. (Supp. 1925) §§ 5191 al, 5191 al0; OREGON CODE ANN. (1930) §§
22-802; MINN. STAT. (Mason 1927) §§ 7699-14. The pledge may also be
defeated as an unlawful preference if made in contemplation of insolvency.
Parks v. Knapp, 29 F. (2d) 547 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928); Farmers' Say. Bank
v. Bergin, 52 S. D. 1, 216 N. W. 597 (1927), affd on rehearing, 53 S. D.
296, 220 N. W. 859 (1928).
7 Merrill v. National Bank of Jacksonville, 173 U. S. 131, 19 Sup. Ct 360
(1899); Citizens' State Bank v. First National Bank, 93 Ran. 109, 157
Pac. 392 (1916); Carter v. Brock, 162 La. 12, 110 So. 71 (1926); Cantley
v. Little River Drainage Dist., 2 S. W. (2d) 607 (Mo. 1928). The precise
distinction in legal effect between a loan and a deposit is vague. In dis-
tinguishing between the two for the purpose of determining the validity
of a pledge, the courts seem to rely on how the transaction is handled on
the books of the bank, and what the parties call it. See Auten v. United
States Nat. Bank, 174 U. S. 125, 19 Sup. Ct. 623 (1899); 1 Monsn, B,%r's
AND BANKING (6th ed. 1926) § 289, n. 5.
8 See Williams v. Hall, supra note 3, at 589, 249 Pac. at 758; Page Trust
Co. v. Rose, szqpra note 3, at 676, 135 S. E. at 797; Grigsby v. Peoples'
Bank supra note 3, at 193, 11 S. W. (2d) at 674.
9 See cases cited supra. note 8.
10 See Arkansas-Louisiana Highway Improvement Dist. v. Taylor, supra
note 3, at 446, 6 S. W. (2d) at 535; Commercial Bank and Trust Co. v.
Citizens' Trust & Guaranty Co., supra note 3, at 575, 156 S. W. at 104;
Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Consolidated School Dist., supra note
3, at 288, 219 N. W. at 165; Divide County v. Baird, supra note 3, at 50,
212 N. W. at 239 Foster v. City of Longview, 26 S. W. (2d) 1059, 1061
(Texas, 1930).
1 The argument is sometimes made that the assets are not diminished
by a pledge because they are replaced by the deposit. See Page Trust Co.
v. Rose, supra note 3, at 677, 135 S. E. at 797. The fallacy of this contcn-
tion is that upon liquidation of the bank unsecured depositors will be de-
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is particularly unfair in view of the fact that banks rarely, if ever, indicate
in their statements the extent to which assets are the subject of pledge.12
Moreover, such a practice would permit officers and directors of banks,
especially "family" banks, to escape all loss to their own deposits at the
expense of other depositors. In the rare case where a pledge of assets may
seem necessary to prevent a withdrawal by a large depositor in order to
preserve the solvency of the bank, the bank can execute a surety bond,1 ,
rather than a pledge, although the premium on such a bond may in some
ifistances be prohibitive. The growing number of jurisdictions which have
denied the validity of a pledge to secure even public deposits, unless ex-
pressly authorized by statute,14 would indicate that the instant case will
probably be followed, although dicta in many of the public deposit cases
are broad enough to cover the validity of a pledge securing private deposits.
The power of a receiver of an insolvent bank to set aside such a pledge
has in some cases been defeated by the doctrine that the receiver stands in
the shoes of the bank, and is estopped to deny the validity of the pledge
after the bank has accepted the benefits of the deposit, unless he makes
restitution by tendering back the funds deposited.15 Since the validity of
such pledges will almost always arise upon the insolvency of the bank, the
effect of such decisions is tantamount to holding the pledge valid,1 In
other jurisdictions, however, and in the instant decision, the receiver has
been permitted to plead the invalidity of the pledge on the grounds that
he is also the representative of creditors and that the pledge is void, not
merely voidable.1 7 Moreover, in every decision denying the receiver this
power, the pledge has been security for public deposits which the court
considered valid.' 8 A court committed to such a holding, however, may
find it difficult to alter its position when the power of a receiver to set
prived of the difference between the amount of the pro rata share the
secured depositor would have received had the pledge not been made and
the full amount of his deposit. In case of a large deposit this may be a
considerable factor. Moreover, the value of assets pledged will more likely
than not be greater than the deposit, and subject to sacrifice at the forced
sale on the part of the pledger.
12 It has been stated that publication of such information would be dis-
astrous for a bank by prompting heavy withdrawals. See Commercial Bank
& Trust Co. v. Citizens' Trust & Guaranty Co., supra note 3, at 574, 156
S. W. at 164. In Grigsby v. People's Bank, supra note 3, at 192, 11 S. W.
(2d) at 676, in which a pledge to secure a public deposit was upheld, it
was said that a true bank statement would contain this information, and
that it was the duty of the Banking Department to require it.
13 There is scant authority as to the power of a bank to execute a surety
bond to protect a private depositor. In Leonard Co-op. Creamery Ass'n
v. First State Bank, 168 Minn. 28, 209 N. W. 631 (1926) it was held in a
well reasoned opinion that such power existed under a general statutory
grant of power. See Smith v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., supra note
1, at 867. A surety bond to secure public deposits has been held valid, In
the absence of statute. Nebraska v. First Nat. Bank, 88 Fed. 947 (C. C. D.
Neb. 1898) (national bank); Weddington v. Jones, 41 Tex. Civ. App. 463,
91 S. W. 818 (1906).
14 Cases cited supra note 10.
15 Williams v. Hall, supra note 3; City of Williston v. Ludowese, 53 N.
D. 797, 208 N. W. 82 (1926) ; Cantley v. Little River Drainage Dist., supra
note 7; Ainsworth v. Kruger, 80 Mont. 468, 260 Pac. 1055 (1927).
16 See Divide County v. Baird, supra note 3, at 60, 212 N. W. at 244.
1T Cases cited supra note 10.
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aside a pledge securing a private deposit is at issue unless the pledge is
prohibited by statute.is
STATUTORY L~hIITATION UPON JUDICIAL DISCRETION IN APPOINTMENT OF
RECEIVER FOR STATE BANK
A STATUTE regulating banks and banking in Nebraska, after providing for
the summary taking possession of a delinquent bank by the Secretary of
the Department of Trade and Commerce, requires that further procedure
looking to the liquidation of the bank may be had only after hearing before
a court of equity and pursuant to its orders. The statute then directs that
the Secretary "shall be the sole and only receiver of failed or insolvent
banks." I In the recent case of State v. State Bank of MAftare,2 the
Supreme Court of Nebraska held that this statutory direction was but a
legislative recommendation and not binding upon the court appointing the
receiver, since, construed as mandatory, it would be an unconstitutional
encroachment on a judicial prerogative.
Since 1864 the National Banking Act has provided that the Comptroller
of the Currency may, upon summary procedure, take possession of national
banks in case of certain delinquencies.3 Statutory provisions now exist for
similar action by a corresponding administrative official in practically
every state with regard to state banks.' This action, however, is but tem-
porary, being designed to protect the assets which, because of the peculiar
delicacy of a bank's "credit," would be subject to heavy losses in case of
any delay between a petition to a court of chancery and the appointment
of a receiver and granting of protecting injunctions.
Further procedure toward liquidation of the bank then takes varied
turns in different states. In the most usual case, following the procedure
of the National Banking Act,5 the administrative officer retains possession,
subject to suit by the bank for injunction in case it wishes to question the
propriety of such action.0 Though in all such cases the administrative
officer, or his receiver, may sell or compound bad debts, or sell other prop-
erty, only upon the order of a court,7 still it has been held that such assets
are not thereby brought under the control and protection of the court;"
and that the administrative receiver is not an officer of the court.0 Where
is See cases cited supra note 15.
i NEB. Comp. STAT. (1929) §§ 8-190, B-192.
2 U. S. Daily, April 23, 1932, at 354.
3 13 STAT. 99 (1864) and amendments, 12 U. S. C. §§ 1-220 (1926).
4 See "Banks and Banking," state codes.
513 STAT. 115 (1864) 12 U. S. C. § 192 (1926).
6This is true in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Washington,
and Wisconsin.
7This is true in all the states mentioned in note 6, supra. Typical provi-
sions will be found in ALA. CODS (Michie, 1928) § 61307; ARZ. CODE
(Struckmeyer, 1928) § 246; ARx. DIG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921)
§ 719. (See indices to codes or compiled statutes).
8 In re Chetwood, 165 U. S. 443, 17 Sup. CL 385 (1897) Snohomish Co.
v. Puget Sound National Bank, 81 Fed. 518 (C. C. D. Wash. 1897).
9 Fifer v. Williams, 5 F. (2d) 286 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925). But see Matter
of Union Bank, 96 Misc. 299, 161 N. Y. Supp. 29 (1916): "The Superin-
tendent of Banks, while temporarily an administrative officer, assumes the
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such procedure obtains, a number of states expressly prohibit the appoint-
ment of equity receivers by the courts; 0 and even where the administra-
tive liquidation is not expressly declared to be exclusive by statute, it is
generally so held by the courts."l
Another procedure, also quite common, provides that the state's attorney,
upon request of the administrative officer, petition the court, in the usual
manner, for the appointment of an equity receiver,12 to whom the admin-
istrative officer then turns over the assets for liquidation.13 Under this
procedure several states follow, in effect, the Nebraska provision that a
common liquidating agency, administratively controlled, must be appointed
receiver by the court.1 4 This is done either by directing the court to appoint
such administrative officer as its receiver,15 or by legislatively investing the
status of a receiver, subject to judicial review, when he takes over an in-
solvent bank"; rev'd on other grounds, 176 App. Div. 477, 163 N. Y.
Supp. 485 (2d Dep't 1917).10 ALA. CODE (Michie, 1928) § 6360; COLO. ANN. STAT. (Mills, 1930) §
381i; N. C. CODE ANN. (1931) § 218 (c) (22); ORE. CODE ANN. (1930)§§ 22-1904, 22-1906; WASH. COMP. STAT. (Remington, 1922) § 3276,
11A court may not in general appoint a receiver of its own after the
Comptroller of the Currency has appointed one; see Easton v. Iowa, 188
U. S. 220, 23 Sup. Ct. 288 (1903), or interfere with a receiver so appointed.
Cadle v. Baker, 20 Wall. 650 (U. S. 1874); Weitzel v. Brown, 224 Mass.
190, 112 N. E. 945 (1916). See also Krauthoff v. Kansas City Joint-Stock:
Land Bank, 23 F. (2d) 71 (C. C. A. 8th, 1928), where judicial interference
with a receiver appointed by Federal Farm Loan Board is denied.
1 The equity receiver is, of course, an officer of the court. Property in
his possession is in the custody and under the control and protection of the
court.
13 Typical of this procedure, note CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) §§ 3870-71;
TEx. REv. Civ. CODE (Vernon, 1928) art. 370-71; VA. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1930) § 4149 (52).
14This is true in Arizona, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
Pennsylvania and South Dakota. See citations infra notes 15 and 16.
15 MICH. CoPr. LAws (1929) § 11959: (In substance) The court appoints
a receiver, who must be the banking commissioner or someone recommended
by him. "The practice under our state banking laws places the circuit
judge in the position of the Comptroller under the national banking act.
The receiver is an officer of the court." Foster v. Row, 120 Milcli. 1,
7, 79 N. W. 696, 698 (1899). See infra note 25.
N. H. PuB. LAWS (1926) c. 268, § 4: The Banking Commissioner "shall
represent the facts by petition to some justice of the superior court, who
shall direct the Commissioner to take possession of the property . . , until
its affairs shall finally be liquidated"-which is done under orders of the
court.
N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) §§ 13-419: Upon report of the bank
examiner, the attorney-general "shall institute . . .proceedings . . . for
the purpose of having the state bank examiner appointed as receiver."
"This section does not make it compulsory on the district judge . . . to
appoint the bank examiner as the receiver, but he has discretion in the
matter and may appoint another as receiver." Attorney General v. Ryan, 27
N. M. 651, 204 Pac. 68 (1922). (This is a matter of interpretation. The
question of constitutionality is expressly not decided. A dissent declares in
favor of constitutionality.)
S. D. Com.P. LAws (1929) §§ 8925, 8928: Upon report of the Superin-
tendent of Banks the attorney general "shall apply to . . . court . . . for
an order placing the Superintendent of Banks . . . in charge of bank."
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administrative receiver with "all the rights, powers, and duties of a re-
ceiver appointed by any court of equity" in the state.16 Although the con-
stitutionality of this statutory limitation upon judicial discretion in the
appointment of receivers has not heretofore been called into quetion,2' the
situation created has been commented upon by courts of last resort with
apparent approval. s
The flexible doctrine of the separation of powers has given way repeatedly
in recent years to the interests of administrative efficiency.'0 The ineffi-
ciency and high cost of equity receiverships, often accompanied by further
losses through corruption of receivers and their agents, are well known,
and have lately become increasingly notorious.20 Remedy has been sought
in a rather wide-spread practice of liquidating the business failures of a
given locality through a common agency and a regulated procedure of
friendly adjustment without court action.21 In other instances, courts have
on their own motion adopted common liquidating agencies,2 although this
practice has been criticized as "judicial legislation." 23 The Nebraska and
other similar statutes provide the necessary legislation for the adoption
of a common liquidating agency in the ease of state banks.
In holding that the legislative direction to employ such procedure was an
encroachment upon its judicial prerogatives, the Nebraska court succeeded
in distinguishing the ease from that of the administrative receiver under
the-National Bank Act, whose appointment and employment have been held
constitutional.24 On the other hand, though there are technical arguments
which might be urged in favor of the constitutionality of the Nebraska
(The word "receiver" is not used here, but the Superintendent acts under
the orders of the court throughout.)
-6Auz. CODE: (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 247: "When the affairs of a bank
have come into the hands of the superintendent for liquidation, the rela-
tions between the court and the superintendent shall be the same as the
relation of the court and a receiver under the laws now exdsting."
PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 7, § 21-32: The Secretary of the
Commonwealth takes possession of the bank, displacing any receiver that
may have been appointed by a court; after which the Secretary shall "have
all the rights, powers, and duties of a receiver appointed by any court of
equity in the Commonwealth.' The Secretary acts throughout under orders
of the court.
. ]But see the recent case, State v. Cannon, 240 N. W. 441 (Wis. 1932),
denying the legislature the power to reinstate as an officer of the court an
attorney who had been disbarred, which is relied upon in the Nebraska
decision. However, this case expressly recognizes the right of the legis-
lature to prescribe mnimum qualifications for such officers, as may be
necessary "to protect the public . . . from incompetence and fraud."
See also Justices' Opinion (Mass.), U. S. Daily, Apr. 30, 1932, at 402,
to the same effect as the Wisconsin case.
is See Foster v. Row, supra, note 15; Hammons v. Grant, 26 Ariz. 344,
225 Pac. 485 (1924). But see also Attorney General v. Ryan supra note 15.
19 See ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADIINISTRATIVE LAW, p. 18 ct scq.
2o Sturges, Commwrcial Arbitration (1924) 34 YALE L. J. 480 at 490 Ct
seq.; Douglas and Weir, Equity Receiverships in the U. S. Disthict Court
of Connecticut, 1920-29, (1930) 4 CONN. BAR J. 1; Billig, What Price Bank-
9-uptcy: A Plea for "Friendly Adjustmnt" (1929) 14 Conr. L. Q. 413.21 Bilig, op. cit. supra note 20.
22 Ibid.
23 Torregano, Appointment of Official Receivers iu Bankruptcy (1929) 15
A. B. A. J. 442.
2 Bushnell v. Leland, 164 U. S. 584, 17 Sup. Ct. 209 (1397).
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statute,25 it is sufficient simply to note that it is a late day, in the present
era of administrative law, to contest the constitutionality of highly bene-
ficial economic legislation on the sole ground that it infringes, in an inci-
dental manner that cannot be avoided, upon the doctrine of the separation
of powers.
CONTINUED LIABILITY OF DIRECTORS DESPITE REPEAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISION
AN Iowa statute provided that any impairment of the capital stock of a
bank should be restored "by ratable assessment upon the stockholders,
for the amount of stock held by them," and required the directors to set
aside for public sale a sufficient amount of the stock of any stockholder
who failed to pay his assessment within a specified period. Later a section
was added providing that the stockholder should be personally liable for
the deficiency if the proceeds of the sale -were insufficient to satisfy his
entire assessment liability. In the recent case of Shriver v. Woodbiw Sav'-
ings Bank,1 the Supreme Court held that the personal liability provision
was effective even as to a stockholder who had acquired stock prior thereto
and that it did not operate as a deprivation of property without due
process. And in Coombes v. Getz 2 the same court decided that the repeal
of the California constitutional provision which subjected the directors or
trustees of corporations to joint and several liability to the creditors and
stockholders "for all moneys embezzled or misappropriated by the officers
of such corporation . . . during the term of office of such director or
trustee," did not operate to defeat the cause of action of a creditor who
had extended credit to a corporation prior to the repeal. The obligation
of a director under this provision was held by a divided court 3 to be
contractual and not subject to impairment by such a constitutional change.
The courts are generally agreed that the liability of stockholders to stat-
utory assessments to provide for the restoration of an impairment of capital
as in the Shriver case, or for the benefit of creditors of an insolvent or
judgment-proof corporation, is within the constitutional protection afforded
by the contract clause.4 At least two theories may be advanced in support
of this result: (1) that the stockholder by voluntarily subscribing to stock
impliedly agrees to perform the obligations imposed by existing laws; a
and (2) that the legislature by subjecting the stockholders to personal
liability for the debts of the company to that extent removes the corporate
protection from them.6 But with regard to legislation imposing personal
liability upon officers and directors for neglect or misconduct, the liability
thus created cannot in any proper sense be regarded as contractual. Nor
25 For example, as was said in Attorney General v. Bank of Michigan,
Harr. Ch. 315, 321 (Mich. 1845): "The jurisdiction of the chancery court
in this class of cases is based upon statutes. It has no jurisdiction at coin-
mon law."
I U. S. Daily, April 14, 1932, at 290, aff'g 236 N. W. 10 (Iowa, 1931).
2 U. S. Daily, April 13, 1932, at 283, rev'g 1 Pac. (2d) 992 (1931) which
was affirmed on rehearing, 4 Pac. (2d) 157 (1931).
s Justices Cardozo, Brandeis and Stone dissented.
4 Whitman v. Oxford National Bank, 176 U. S. 559, 20 Sup. Ct. 477
(1900); Flash v. Connecticut, 109 U. S. 371, 3 Sup. Ct. 263 (1883); Har-
rison v. Remington Paper Co., 140 Fed. 385 (C. C. A. 8th, 1905).
5 See Hawthorne v. Calef, 2 Wall. 10, 22 (U. S. 1864).
6 See Corning v. McCullough, 1 N. Y. 47, 54 (1847) ; Hawthorne v. Calef,
mpra note 5, at 22-23.
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can such liability be said to be strictly penal, since the duty is to the
creditors and the remedy is private and civil. These and other considera-
tions have led the courts to label such statutes remedial as to creditors of
the corporation.7 They are, however, penal in the sense that they may be
repealed at any time, even after action has been commenced by the creditor,
without violating the constitutional prohibition against laws impairing the
obligation of a contract. It follows that a creditor has no vested right
under such a statute until perfected by final judgment.8
Where the contract alleged to have been impaired is founded upon some
provision of the laws or constitution of a state the Supreme Court will
adopt and apply the construction placed thereon by the court of last resort
of the state,9 but will determine for itself whether the product of such
construction is a contract in the sense in which the term is used in Section
10 of Article I of the Constitution.'0 In strictness no question of the im-
pairment of the obligation of a contract was presented in the Slziivcr
case but is was rather the contention of the stockholder that the later
statute imposed a personal liability where none had existed before, a point
as to which the Iowa cases were silent, and that its imposition operated as a
deprivation of property without due process. The Supreme Court, however,
rejected this contention, holding that the'earlier statutes defined a liability
contractual in nature which, even though no specific remedy for enforce-
ment had been provided, would have been enforceable in full against the
stockholder in the common law action of debt or its modern equivalent
And the very fact that the remedy provided was on its face inadequate
to compel full performance was persuasive that it was not intended as
exclusive. As thus reasoned the case involved no more than the applica-
tion of the well-settled doctrine that in general a person has no vested
rights in the particular remedies or modes of procedure in existence at
the time a contract is entered into."
To the majority of the court in the Coombes case the liability of directors
under the California constitution was contractual and not subject to im-
pairment. In a number of cases the Supreme Court of California had
7 Credit Alen's Co. v. Vickery, 62 Colo. 214, 161 Pac. 297 (1916); Ma-
chinery Co. v. Smith, 87 Kan. 331, 124 Pac. 414 (1912); BANTx'n,,
M1ANUAL OF CORPORATION LAW AND PICTICE (2d ed. 1930) § 122.
SBAU.ANTINE, op. cit. supru note 7, at § 122.
9 See Warburton v. White, 176 U. S. 484, 495, 20 Sup. Ct. 404, 409
(1900).
10 See Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U. S. 364, 379, 380, 46 Sup.
Ct. 569, 573 (1926). In Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U. S. 142, 146, 42 Sup. Ct.
214, 215 (1922) the court said: "The word 'contracts' in § 10 of Article
I of the Constitution is used in its popular sense as signifying an agree-
ment of two or more minds, upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to
do certain acts. 'Mlutual assent [express or implied] to its terms is of
its very essense.'"
21 See Oshkosh Waterworks v. Oshkosh, 187 U. S. 437, 23 Sup. Ct. 234
(1903); Henley v. Meyers, 215 U. S. 373, 30 Sup. Ct. 148 (1910). This
is true even though the new remedy be less convenient. See Bronson v.
Kenzie, 1 How. 311 (U. S. 1843). The line between remedy and obliga-
tion is, of course, shadowy, and in a particular case the legislative altera-
tion of a remedial right with reference to a contract previously entered
into may be so drastic as to diminish substantive rights under that con-
tract and in effect impair its obligation as, for example, a state statute
which substantially withdraws a debtor's property from execution. Gunn
v. Barry, 15 Wall. 610 (U. S. 1872). See also Barintz v. Beverly, 103
U. S. 118, 16 Sup. Ct. 1042 (1896).
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declared that the liability imposed was "one of suretyship and, therefore,
one of contract." 12 But as the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Cardozo
points out, this seems true "only in a qualified sense, as the expression of
a legal fiction." 23 In no case, moreover, was so broad a statement neces-
sary to the decision reached, and the most that can be said of the Cali-
fornia cases is that they established the proposition that the provision
was not penal in the sense that recovery could be had thereunder arbi-
trarily and without actual proof of loss as well as of misappropriation,
but was remedial.' 4 Consistent with this view is another line of California
decisions which hold that a cause of action created wholly by statute may
be modified or cancelled by amendment or repeal until perfected by final
judgment. 5 These decisions, when read into the contract in the instant
case,' 6 form the basis for the main contention made in the dissent, namely,
that the liability of the defendant was defeasible in its origin and that the
repeal of the constitutional provision was a contingency which was as
much a part of the contract as was the liability.
POWER TO COMPEL PHYSICAL CONNECTION BETWEEN TELEPHONE COMIANIES
Two telephone companies, A and B, owned and operated independent local
exchanges within a small community. A third company, C, possessing it
large organization and important long distance facilities, had for some time
maintained physical connection with company A under a contract which
did not purport to make the service exclusive. Company B, having unsuc-
cessfully sought a similar arrangement with C, brought an action In man-
damus to compel the latter to permit a physical connection with its switch-
board. A decree for the plaintiff was reversedA
At common law, a telephone company has no duty to effect physical con-
nection with another,2 and exclusive contracts for connected service between
12 Dean v. Shingle, 198 Cal. 652, 662, 246 Pac. 1049, 1053 (1926) ; Her-
cules Oil Refining Co. v. Hocknell, 5 Cal. App. 702, 705, 91 Pac. 341, 343
(1907). In In re Brown, 164 Fed. 673 (C. C. A. 9th, 1908) it was held
that a claim against a director under the California constitutional provi-
sion was provable in bankruptcy as a "contract, express or implied," under
Section 63 of the Bankruptcy Act. But the term "contract" as there used
is more inclusive than the term as used in the contract clause. A tort
claim is provable in bankruptcy if the tortious act is of such a nature
as to authorize a waiver of the tort and a recovery in quasi-contract. Clarke
v. Rogers, 228 U. S. 534, 33 Sup. Ct. 587 (1913). But the'obligation of a
judgment based on tort is not an "obligation of contract," notwithstanding
a judgment is sometimes classified as a quasi-contract. Louisiana v. Mayor,
109 U. S. 285 (1883).
3 The contract clause is aimed at true agreements, and not at quasi-
contracts as distinguished from agreements implied in fact. See Crane v.
Hahlo, supra note 10; Louisiana v. Mayor, supra note 12; Fisk v. Jeffer-
son Police Jury, 116 U. S. 131, 6 Sup. Ct. 329 (1885).
24 Dean v. Shingle, supra note 12.
15 Moss v. Smith, 171 Cal. 777, 155 Pac. 90 (1916) ; Napa State Hospital
v. Flaherty, 134 Cal. 315, 66 Pac. 322 (1901).
16 See Farmers' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U. S. 649, 660, 43
Sup. Ct. 651, 655 (1923); Ennis Water Works v. Ennis, 233 U. S. 652,
657, 34 Sup. Ct. 767, 768 (1914).
'State v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 240 N. W. 252 (Iowa, 1932).
2 JONES, TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANIES, (2d ed. 1916) § 263.
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two telephone companies have generally been held valid and enforceable. 3
A few courts, however, have reached a contrary result by holding that a
telephone company, by voluntarily connecting with another, thereby waives
its right to independence.- This theory has been invoked to disallow the
severance of an established connection when the public has come to rely
upon the service, and to require the extension of equal facilities to all
companies.6 But the majority rule, subscribed to by the court in the prin-
cipal case, is to the effect that there is no duty to connect, even though
connection has previously been made with another company.7 It may be
observed that under the common law, the situation is approached through
the principles of individual property rights which have no direct bearing
on the problem of securing efficient means of communication. On the other
hand, where there is a controlling statute, or a commission functioning
by virtue of statutory authority, the question arises whether there has been
a valid exercise of the state's police power,8 and the test applied is the
3 Home Telephone Co. v. North Manchester Telephone Co., 47 Ind. App.
411, 92 N. E. 558 (1910), rehearing denied, 93 N. E. 234 (1910); Cumber-
land Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. State, 100 Miss. 102, 54 So. 670 (1911) ;
Home Telephone Co. v. Sarcoxie Light & Telephone Co., 236 Mo. 114, 139
S. W. 108 (1911), overruling Home Telephone Co. v. Granby & Neosho
Telephone Co., 147 Mo. App. 216, 126 S. W. 773 (1910). And the fact that
such contracts provide against competition between the parties does not
render them invalid, the restrictions being held incidental to the main pur-
pose of extending business. Wayne-Monroe Telephone Co. v. Ontario Tele-
phone Co., 60 Misc. 435, 112 N. Y. Supp. 424 (1908); McKinley Telephone
Co. v. Cumberland Telephone Co., 152 Wis. 359, 140 N. W. 38 (1913).
4 United States Telephone Co. v. Central Union Telephone Co., 171 Fed.
130 (C.'C. N. D. Ohio 1909), aff'd, 202 Fed. 66 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913), ccrt.
den-, 229 U. S. 620, 33 Sup. Ct. 1049 (1913) ; Union Trust & Savings Bank
of East St. Louis v. Kinloch Long-Distance Telephone Co., 253 Ill. 202,
101 N. E. 535 (1913).
5 Campbellsville Co. v. Lebanon Co., 118 Ky. 277, 80 S. W. 1114 (1904)
(three judges dissenting), aff'd, 84 S. W. 518 (1905); Clinton-Dunn Tele-
phone Co. v. Carolina Telephone & Telegraph Co., 159 N. C. 9, 74 S. E.
636 (1912); cf. State v. Trego County Co-operative Telephone Co., 112
Kan. 701, 212 Pac. 902 (1923). But connection does not have to be main-
tained where there is no contract. Rural Home Telephone Co. v. Kentucky
and Indiana Telephone Co., 128 Ky. 209, 107 S. W. 787 (1908) ; see Mem-
phis Telephone Co. v. Cumberland Telephone. & Telegraph Co., 231 Fed.
835, 840 (C. C. A. 6th, 1916). Or where the oral contract is void under the
statute of frauds. Bastin Telephone Co. v. Richmond Telephone Co., 117
Ky. 122, 77 S. W. 702 (1903). And the connection may be severed where the
contract is by its provisions terminable. Oklahoma-Arkansas Telephone
Co. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 45 F. (2d) 995 (C. C. A. 8th,
1930), cert. den., 283 U. S. 822, 51 Sup. Ct. 346 (1931).
6 See State v. Cadwallader, 172 Ind. 619, 636, 87 N. E. 644, 050 (1909);
of. McCardle v. Akron Telephone Co., 87 Ind. App. 59, 156 N. E. 469 (1927),
rehearing denied, 160 N. E. 48 (1928).
7Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Anderson, 196 Fed. 699 (E. D.
Wash. 1912); Clay County Co-operative Telephone Association v. South-
western Bell Telephone Co., 107 Kan. 169, 190 Pac. 747 (1920); Home
Telephone Co. v. Peoples Telephone & Telegraph Co., 125 Tenn. 270, 141
S. W. 845 (1911).
8 Pacific Telegraph & Telephone Co. v. Wright-Dickinson Hotel Cd., 214
Fed. 666 (D. Ore. 1914); Hooper Telephone Co. v. Nebraska Telephone Co.,
96 Neb. 245, 147 N. W. 674 (1914); City of Milbank v. Dakota Central
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reasonableness of the regulation under the circumstances., Thus orders
have been held invalid which compelled the union of two competing com-
panies,O or compelled connection between two parallel lines at a point
which would deprive the originating company of the full use of its line.1
A situation such as that existing in the principal case, where two companies
are allowed to compete within a small community, is without question
highly undesirable. But as the denial of the right to connect with the large
system may eventually drive the plaintiff company out of business, the
result of the decision may prove beneficial. However, the method employed
is far from an orderly disposal of the problem. The case illustrates the
irrelevance to the problem of common law principles, and reveals a strik-
ing need for statutory regulation which would either prevent such a situa-
tion from arising or would provide efficient means of coping with it,
CONSENT RECEIVERSHIP INSTITUTED BY NON-JUDGMENT CREDITOR
THE friendly receivership in the federal courts, forecast by a dictum in
Hollins v. Brierfield Coal and Iron Co.,' was first fully sanctioned in Ro
Mtropolitan Railway Receivership.2 The Supreme Court, in the latter
case, overruling the charges of collusion and want of jurisdiction, refused
to dismiss a receiver whose appointment had been procured by a friendly
non-resident non-judgment creditor with the consent of the defendant com-
pany. This method of evading the necessity of a judgment with return
of nu!la bona on execution 3 was widely employed in subsequent eases. 4
Telephone Co., 37 S. D. 504, 159 N. W. 99 (1916). Regulatory power may be
delegated to a municipal council. Southwestern Telegraph & Telephone
Co. v. State, 150 S. W. 604 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), aff'd, 207 S. W. 308
(1918).
A statute such as that involved in the principal case, requiring merely
equal facilities to all applicants is not sufficient to effect connection. Home
Telephone Co. v. People's Telephone & Telegraph Co., supra note 7,
9 One court, however, has held an order of a commission requiring phys-
ical connection void as an attempted exercise of the power of eminent
domain without adequate compensation. Pacific Telegraph & Telephone Co.
v. Eshleman, 166 Cal. 640, 137 Pac. 1119 (1913). By statute the procedure
for connection may be in eminent domain. Billings Mutual Telephone Co.
v. Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Co., 155 Fed. 207 (C. C. D. Mont, 1907).
10 Pioneer Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. State, 71 Ol. 305, 177 Pac. 580
(1918) ; Pioneer Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. State, 77 Okla. 216, 186 Pac.
934 (1920). But cf. Allen v. Railroad Commission, 202 Wis. 223, 231 N
W. 184 (1930).
-1 Gilman v. Somerset Farmer's Co-operative Telephone Co., 129 Me. 213,
151 Atl. 440 (1930).
1 150 U. S. 371, 380, 14 Sup. Ct. 127, 129 (1893).
2 208 U. S. 90, 28 Sup. Ct. 219 (1908) (refusal to grant a receiver here
would have caused great inconvenience to those using the railway system
in New York City). Note (1909) 3 ILL. L. REV. 385.
3 Scott v. Neely, 140 U. S. 106, 11 Sup. Ct. 712 (1891) ; Cates v. Allen,
149 U. S. 451, 13 Sup. Ct. 977 (1893); Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen,
261 U. S. 491, 43 Sup. Ct. 454 (1923); cf. Ky. Wagon Co. v. Jones &
Hopkins Co., 248 Fed. 272 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918) (creditor with a trust
in his favor does not need a judgment).
4 American Can Co. v. Erie Preserving Co., 171 Fed. 540 (W. D. N. Y.
1909), aff'd, 183 Fed. 96 (C. C. A. 2d, 1910); Burban v. Peters Salt &
Lumber Co., 190 Fed. 262 (W. D. Mich. 1911); Field v. Kansas City
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The liberality of the courts in granting receiverships is indicated by an
instance in which a federal court took jurisdiction through the petition
of a defendant corporation for removal to that court of an action instituted
in a state court by a non-judgment creditor, and treated the petition as
tantamount to consent.5 However, in Harkin v. Brundagvo the Supreme
Court, by way of dictum, indicated that a consent receivership obtained by
a simple contract creditor would not be upheld except where the receiver-
ship, not having been seasonably opposed, had "proceeded to such a point
that it -would be detrimental to all concerned to discharge the receiver.. 11
There is ground to believe that objection to the granting of a receivership
may be raised by an intervenor and the appointment of a receiver pre-
vented by disproving the allegations of the complaint which the defendant
corporation has admittedV
Subsequent to the Harhin v. Brundage dictum, the District Court of New
York in Mienicipal Financial Corporation v. Bankus Corporations dis-
charged a temporary receiver when the report of his investigation disclosed
a negligible quantity of liquid assets and a complicated financial structure
-with a close intercorporate relation between the petitioning creditor and
the co-operating debtor. The court strongly disapproved the practice of
granting consent receiverships where it was improbable that the continua-
tion of the enterprise as a going concern would be the ultimate result, and
indicated that, had it the power to do so,9 it would order the defendant
into bankruptcy as the only proper administration under such circum-
stances. It further suggested the prophylaxis of a temporary receiver, to
investigate and report, before a final determination of the receiver-hip
petition.1o
In the recent case of Kingsport Press, Inc. v. Brief English Systemns,
Inc.,1 the Second Circuit Court upheld a consent receivership, using a
test similar to that suggested in Municipal Financial Corporation V. Banlnus
Corporation, The dictum in Harkin v. Brundage was emasculated by treat-
ing it as applicable only to the "ordinary case" and not to the "unusual"
situation presented by the instant case in which it appeared possible to
preserve the business and fully pay the debts of the defendant corporation
through a rceiver's administration. Since a proper ease was shown, the
objection of a judgment creditor, though timely, was denied."
Refining Co., 9 F. (2d) 213 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925); Luhrig Collieries Co. v.
Interstate Coal & Dock Co., 281 Fed. 265 (S. D. N. Y. 1922), aff'd,
287 Fed. 711, (C. C. A. 2d, 1923); First National Bank of Medford v.
Stewart Fruit Co., 17 F. (2d) 621 (N. D. Cal. 1927) (where the court
applied the consent receivership rule to a private corporation and refused
to consider it limited to cases involving an affected public interest).
zFinney v. Continental Baking & Milling Corp., 17 F. (2dY 107 (D. Ind.
1927).
Is See 276 U. S. 36, 52, 48 Sup. Ct. 268, 274 (1928); Note (1928) 41
HARv. L. REv. 804.
7 See American S. S. Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 42 F. (2d)
886, 891 (S. D. N. Y. 1930).
8 45 F. (2d) 902 (S. D. N. Y. 1930); see Notes (1931) 40 YU L. J.
996; (1931) 44 HARV. L. IREV. 991.
9 Manhattan Rubber Mfg. Co. v. Lucey Mfg. Co., 5 F. (2d) 39 (C. C. A.
2d, 1925); Note (1926) 11 CORN. L. Q. 371.
lo Municipal Financial Corp. v. Bankus Corp. and Municipal Financial
Corp. v. City Financial Corp., supra note 8, at 907.
-54 F. (2d) 497 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
-It should be noticed that the procedure suggested by Judge Woolsey
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These decisions indicate that the Harcin v. Brundago dictum has had
no further effect than to cause the federal courts to be more circumspect
in upholding consent receiverships. But it still looms as a warning that
should the abuses attributable to consent receivership practice contnuo,13
the Supreme Court's disapproval may find expression in a reversal of the
rule in Re Metropolitan Railway Receivership.
LIABILITY OF BROKER FOR WRONGFULI HYPOTHECATION OF SECURITIES
IN In 'e Salmon Weed & Co.' a broker filed with the referee of a bank-
rupt customer a claim for debts due on a margin account. The broker
had, however, repledged the stock bought by the customer on this account
to secure a debt in excess of the customer's obligation. Because of tha
action, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the second circuit held that the
broker was liable for conversion 6f the stock and hence, despite the cus-
tomer's failure to demand the stock and tender the amount due, could
recover only the difference between the amount of the customer's obliga-
tion to him and damages for the conversion.
When the broker has expressly repudiated his contract, or gone into
bankruptcy, demand and tender are clearly not conditions precedent to the
maintenance of an action of trover for wrongfully hypothecated securities.9
And in other situations the prevailing trend is to regard them as unnec-
essary,3 although in England 4 and a few5 of the United States demand
and tender are required. In New York, however, although confusion on
this point is rife and the Court of Appeals has never directly passed on
the point,0 more recent pronouncements seem to adopt a minority view.'
in Municipal Financial Corp. v. Bankus Corp., and Municipal Financial
Corp. v. City Financial Corp., supra note 10, was not adopted.
13 For a discussion of some of these abuses see Thacher, Somo Tenden-
cies of Mode. Receiverships (1915) 4 CALIF. L. REV. 32; Frankfurter,
Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts
(1928) 13 CORN. L. Q. 499, 526; Douglas and Weir, Equity Receiverships in
the United States District Court for Connecticut (1930) 4 CONN. BAR J. 1.
153 F. (2d) 335 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931).
2 In re Swift, 112 Fed. 315 (C. C. A. lst,'1901) ; Drake v. Hodgson, 192
App. Div. 676, 183 N. Y. Supp. 486 (1st Dep't 1920); Matter of Pierson,
19 App. Div. 478, 46 N. Y. Supp. 557 (3d Dep't 1897); New York, Lake
Erie & Western R. R. v. Davies, 38 Hun. 477 (N. Y. 1886). See MLIat,
STOCKBROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES (1931) § 73.
3 King Cattle Co. v. Joseph, 158 linn. 481, 198 N. W. 798, 199 N. W.
437 (1924); Sproul v. Sloan, 241 Pa. 284, 88 Atl. 501 (1913).
4Donald v. Suckling, L. R. 1 Q. B. 585 (1866); Halliday v. Holgate,
L. R. 3 Ex. 299 (1868).
5 Kallem v. Vincent, 297 Pac. 974 (Cal. App. 1931). Contra: Fledler
v. Allen, 4 Pac. (2d) 292 (Cal. App. 1931).
6 Wood v. Fisk, 215 N. Y. 233, 109 N. E. 177 (1915) has been erroneously
interpreted as dispensing with the requirement. See MEYE, op. oit. upra
note 2, § 73.
7 That demand and tender are necessary: Mayer v. Monzo, 151 App.
Div. 866, 137 N. Y. Supp. 616 (1st Dep't 1912); Rogers v. Thomson, 215
App. Div. 541, 214 N. Y. Supp. 193 (1st Dep't 1926); of. Faroll v. Japha
& Co., 232 App. Div. 473, 250 N. Y. Supp. 362 (1st Dep't 1931). That
they are unnecessary: Douglas v. Carpenter, 17 App. Div. 329, 45 N. Y.
Supp. 219 (1st Dep't 1897).
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This is surprising in view of the fact that wrongful hypothecation of
securities is by statute made a felony.s It is moreover an undesirable
result since in case of a customer's financial inability to make tender at
the time of conversion, the broker may use the customer's securities for
his own benefit, and, in the event of his subsequent insolvency, throw the
loss upon the customer.
Assuming, however, that the preliminaries to suit have properly been
carried out, there is a further problem with regard to the measure of
damages recoverable by a customer in such an action of conversion. Meas-
ures advanced include the market price of the securities at the time of
the conversion, with interest; 9 the price at the time of trial; ,o and the
highest market price between these two events." The prevailing measure
is, however, the market value of the securities at the time of their unau-
thorized hypothecation, or the highest intermediate value between the time
of notice to the customer of the conversion and a reasonable time there-
after, whichever is higher. 2 This so-called New York rule, adopted in the
instant case has occasionally been misstated as the highest intermediate
value of the securities between the time of the conversion and a reasonable
time after the owner has received notice thereof.' 3 This statement is not
only inaccurate, but undesirable in that the customer is in no way harmed
by the conversion in the absence of a desire to use the repledged securities,
and, if he should desire to dispose of the pledged stock at enhanced prices
at any time during the period of the pledge, he could at once discover
the convergion. Under the rule as accurately stated, the customer has a
reasonable time after notice of the conversion to purchase similar s curi-
ties in mitigation of damages.
CURRENT DECISIONS
ATTonNEYs-SERvicE OF PROCESS IN CouRT-In a suit ancillary to an action
to set aside a fraudulent conveyance,' the plaintiff sought to compcl restora-
tion of assets which had been diverted pcnzdc2it lite to the defendant's
attorney as anticipatory payment for the latter's services. The attorney, a
non-resident, moved to quash the service of process. The Supreme Court
affirmed a denial of the motion 2 on the ground that the general rule
exempting non-resident attorneys from service while in court should not be
8 NEw YoR PENAL LAW (1913) § 956; N. Y. CONS. LAWS (Cahill, 1930)
c. 41. See Legis. (1931) 80 U. OF PA. L. REV. 113.
9 Austin v. Vanderbilt, 48 Ore. 206, 85 Pac. 519 (1906); Bangor Silk
Knitting Co. v. Wise, 277 Pa. 415, 121 Atl. 308 (1923). Or the face value
of the securities, with interest. Band v. Wilson, 4 P. (2d) 807 (Cal. App.
1931).
'
0 Fowle v. Ward, 113 Mlass. 548 (1873).
- In re Berberich's Estate, 264 Pa. 437, 107 Atl. 813 (1919).
Baker v. Drake, 53 N. Y. 211 (1873); Wright v. Bank of Metropolis,
110 N. Y. 237, 18 N. E. 79 (1888); McIntyre v. Whitney, 139 App. Div.
557, 124 N. Y. Supp. 234 (1st Dep't 1910), aff'd, 201 N. Y. 526, 94 N. E.
1096 (1911). See (1920) 33 HARV. L. R6y. 474; (1925) 39 HAuv. L. REV.
124.
13 Galigher v. Jones, 129 U. S. 193, 9 Sup. Ct. 335 (1889); Weaver v.
Commercial Savings Bank, 222 Mich. 337, 192 N. W. 578 (1923); Hedges
v. Burke, 147 Tenn. 247, 247 S. W. 91 (1923).
1 Lamb v. Cramer, 52 Sup. Ct. 315 (U. S. 1932).
2 Lamb v. Schmitt, 52 Sup. Ct. 317 (U. S. 1932).
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applied when such immunity would obstruct the court's administration of
justice in the pending case.
Immunity from service of process while in court seems to have extended
at early common law to all parties.3 In the United States however, the rule
seems to have been restricted to non-residents," except where statutes
exempt witnesses S and jurors 6 from service. The immunity is reasonably
well established where parties plaintiff 7 or defendants are involved, but
the non-resident attorney who claims it faces a conflict of authority in which
the tendency is towards its denial.9 The cases which allow immunity
from service are those in which the process served bears no relation to the
primary suit; but even here, the granting of the exemption is discretionary,
and not a matter of right. As the non-resident attorney enters a foreign
jurisdiction willingly, and under private contract with his client, it is
difficult to justify his exemption. In any event, it is reasonable that the
immunity should not have been granted in the principal case, where its
effect would have been to prejudice the plaintiff's rights in the primary suit.
DECLARATORY JUDGAIENTS--CONTINGENT ON UNCERTAIN EVENT-A lessee oc-
cupied the store space on the first floor of a building which was destroyed
by fire. Subsequently the lessor notified him that his rights under the lease
8 3 BL. Coim. *289. A reasonable time was allowed going to and return-
ing from the place of trial, during which process could not be served,
4 Page & Co. v. MacDonald, 261 U. S. 446, 43 Sup. Ct. 416 (1922) ; Mur-
ray v. Wilcox, 122 Iowa 188, 97 N. W. 1087 (1904); Sofge v. Lowe, 131
Tenn. 626, 176 S. W. 106 (1915).
For a typical exemption provision, see N. Y. CIVIL RIGHTS LAw (1909)§ 25.
6 N. C. CODE ANN. (1931) § 2328.
7 A few cases refuse the privilege to parties plaintiff, apparently because
of the feeling that the plaintiff has, by choosing to sue in the jurisdiction,
invited the service. Nichols v. Horton, 14 Fed. 327 (D. Iowa, 1882) ; Bishop
v. Vose, 27 Conn. 1 (1858). In Iron Dyke Copper Mining Co. v. Iron Dyke
R. Co., 132 Fed. 208 (C. C. D. Ore., 1904), the privilege was denied a plain-
tiff because he was at the same time committing actionable wrongs against
the defendant. In Lewis v. Miller, 115 Ky. 623, 74 S. W. 691 (1903), a
witness was denied the privilege because of peculiar circumstances con-
nected with the primary suit which made her a party plaintiff in interest.
See also Rizo v. Burruel, 23 Ariz. 137, 202 Pac. 234 (1921); Livengood v.
Ball, 63 Okla. 93, 162 Pac. 768 (1917).
SBut cf. Netograph Co. v. Scrugham, 197 N. Y. 377, 90 N. E. 362 (1910)
(service of civil process on non-resident defendant in New York to answer
criminal charges held proper); Brooks v. State, 3 Boyce 1, 79 Ati, 790
(Del. 1911) (service on president of defendant corporation in court to aid
defendant's lawyers held proper).
9Read v. Neff, 207 Fed. 890 (D. Iowa, 1913); Kansas Wheat Growers'
Ass'n v. Moffat, 129 Kan. 537, 283 Pac. 634 (1930) (attorney, resident of
one county, appeared in court in another county); Hoffman v. Bay County
Circuit Judge, 113 Mich. 109, 71 N. W. 480 (1897) (same); Williams v.
Hatcher, 95 S. C. 49, 78 S. E. 615 (1913). Contra: Paul v. Stuckey, 126
Ark. 389, 189 S. W. 676 (1916) (entrance into another county); Tadgo v.
Byrnes, 179 Cal. 275, 176 Pac. 439 (1918) (attorney not of record in the
litigation); Nelson v. McNulty, 135 Minn. 317, 160 N. W. 795 (1917)
(attorney entered jurisdiction to take depositions); Greenleaf v. People's
Bank, 133 N. C. 292, 45 S. E. 638 (1903); Simon v. DeGersdorff, 166 Wis.
170, 164 N. W. 818 (1917) (attorney waived privilege by asking for other
relief).
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were terminated. Later an announcement appeared in the newspapers that
the lessor proposed to replace the destroyed building with a similar one
and to lease the first floor to a certain corporation. The lessee thereupon
brought suit to enjoin the leasing of such space to any third party, and
for g declaratory judgment that if the building were erected he would have
the right to occupy space corresponding to his former store. The Supreme
Court of Connecticut denied an injunction on the ground that a new building
had not been and might never be erected. Nevertheless, it granted a
declaratory judgment as prayed.'
Most courts have stated that they will not render declaratory judgments
contingent on future and uncertain events.2 This result has b-en justified
on the ground that such judgments would be useless adjudications of moot
questions. The instant case, however, demonstrates the desirability of
granting a contingent declaratory judgment where it will be of value as a
guide to the present conduct of the parties.3 The existing controversy as
to the lessee's future rights resulted in an uncertainty which hindered the
immediate activities of lessee, lessor, and prospective new tenant. And
inasmuch as an injunction could not be granted before erection of the
building, declaratory judgment was the only method of resolving this
uncertainty.
GUARAN TY op PAYMENT-CoNSTRUCTION oF INSTRUENT-Concurrently with
the sale of a secured bond issue of a realty company in which the three
guarantors owned substantially all the capital stock, the guarantors exe-
cuted to the plaintiff as trustee for the bondholders a separate instrument
in which they guaranteed "full, prompt, and punctual payment" of the
bonds. The guarantors expressly waived presentment, demand and notice,
and were to remain bound until full payment, notwithstanding any act or
omission on the part of the trustee or principal debtor. It was held that
the contract was a guaranty of collectibility and not of payment, and that
the plaintiff's failure to aver exhaustion of its remedies against the prin-
cipal debtor was fatal.'
The words "the undersigned guarantee payment," in the absence of
qualifying provisions, are uniformly held'to constitute a guaranty of pay-
ment.2 Particularly have the courts deemed it conclusive that a guaranty
'Sigal v. Wise, 158 Atl. 891 (Conn. 1932).
2 Lummus, Declaratory and Inte-pretatie Judgments hz Massachusetts,
(Aug., 1929) 14 MAss. L. Q. 1, 13; Tanner v. Boynton Lumber Co., 98
N. J. Eq. 85, 129 Atl. 617 (1925); Nashville Trust Co. v. Dake, 162 Tenn.
356, 36 S. W. (2d) 905 (1931); see Sheldon v. Powell, 99 Fla. 782, 790,
128 So. 258, 262 (1930) ; Kariher's Petition, 284 Pa. 455, 472, 131 At. 265,
271 (1925).
3 See Borchard, Jvicial Relief for Peril and Insecurity (1932) 45 HLv.
L. REv. 793; cf. Murray Motor Co. v. Overby, 217 Ky. 198, 289 S. W. 007
(1926); Post v. Metropolitan Casualty Insurance Co., 227 App. Div. 156,
237 N. Y. Supp. 64 (4th Dep't, 1929); Miller v. E. & M. Theatre Corp., 134
Misc. 634, 235 N. Y. Supp. 595 (1929); see Girard Trust Co. v. Tremblay
Motor Co., 291 Pa. 507, 525, 140 Atl. 506, 512, 513 (1928).
' Liquidating Midland Bank v. Stecker, 179 N. E. 504 (Ohio App. 1930).
2Pfeiffer v. Crossley, 91 N. J. L. 433, 103 At. 1000 (1918), aff'd, 92
N. 3. L. 638, 106 AtI. 892 (1919) Klein v. Kern, 94 Tenn. 34, 28 S. W. 295
(1894). For other cases see 1 BRANDT, SuReYSHiP AND GuARTy (3d ed.
1905) § 116. For the distinction between guaranties of payment and col-
lectibility, see 1 BRANDT, op. cit. supra, §§ 110, 111; ARANT, SurETYSHIP
(1931) § 7; Arnold, Primary and Secondary Obligations (1925) 74 U. oF
PA. L. Rav. 36, 64 et seq.
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of payment was intended where the word "payment" isl qualified by such
adjectives as "full, prompt and punctual." 3 In these cases, because of the
apparent lack of ambiguity, the courts, in determining the intent of the
parties, have consistently refused to look beyond the language of the
instrument itself. It is submitted that, in the interpretation of commerclal
documents, any attempt to depart from the well-established rules of con-
struction and to go beyond the terms of the instrument to discover the intent
of the parties as did the court in the instant case, leads only to undesirable
uncertainty in business transactions and increased litigation.
HUSBAND AND WIF--RECOVERY FOR FRAUDULENT PROCUREMENT or ANNUL-
MENT-A wife was prevented from defending an annulment proceeding by
her husband's false representation that he would not prosecute the suit.
The wife's attempt to have the decree vacated failed because of the hus-
band's intervening marriage with an innocent third party.1 Suit was there-
after brought for damages suffered by reason of the fraud. The Supreme
Court of West Virginia overruled a demurrer to the complaint.9
What the plaintiff obviously sought was a substitute for the support to
which she would have been entitled had she been able to set aside the
annulment decree. But since the action was 'brought in trespass on the
case the defendant was able to interpose the defense that at common law
no action may be maintained between husband and wife, even after divorce,
for a tort committed during coverture.3 The court circumvented this formal
difficulty by arguing that the fraud upon which the instant action was
based existed only from the time of the annulment decree which simultan-
eously terminated the marital status.4 The court might have arrived at
the same equitable result by a less tenuous rationalization had it relied
upon the distinction between divorce and annulment. Divorce does not give
a wife power to sue a husband for a tort committed during coverture since
divorce affirms the valid existence of the marriage to the time of the de-
cree.5 An annulment, however, purports to dissolve the marriage relation
ab initio,6 and consequently the martial immunities may be considered never
to have existed. Thus, after an annulment, recovery has been allowed for
rent,? for services,8 for fraud,9 for seduction 10 and for assault and bat-
3 Continental and Commercial National Bank v. Cobb, 200 Fed. 511 (C.
C. A. 1st, 1912) ("full and prompt'payment"); Kleinman v. Sperry, 153
Minn. 447, 190 N. W. 604 (1922) (payment "as same matures"); First Na-
tional Bank v. Jones, 219 N. Y. 312, 114 N. E. 349 (1916) ("full, prompt
and ultimate payment" of notes and renewals); Neil v. Board of Trustees,
31 Ohio St. 15 (1876) (payment "at the times nominated"). For other
examples see ARNOLD, SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY (1927) § 22.
1 Cameron v. Cameron, 107 W. Va. 655, 150 S. E. 225 (1929).
2 Cameron v. Cameron, 162 S. E. 173 (W. Va. 1931).
3 Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U. S. 611, 31 Sup. Ct. lll (1910) ; Abbott
v. Abbott, 67 Me. 304 (1877); Philips v. Barnet, 1 Q. B. D. 436 (1876); 2
BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE (1881) § 105.
4 The dissent, basing its decision on the authorities cited supra note 3,
justifiably attacks the court's reasoning.
See supra note 3.
Riesen v. Riesen, 105 N. J. Eq. 144, 147 Atl. 225 (1929); Matter of
Moncrieff, 235 N. Y. 390, 139 N. E. 550 (1923); Stein v. Dunne 119 App.
Div. 1, 103 N. Y. Supp. 894, (1st Dep't 1907); Taylor v. White, 160 N. C.
38, 75 S. E. 941 (1912); see Notes, W. Va. CODE: (1931) c. 48, art. II, §§
1, 15; TIFFANY, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1921) 56-58.
7 Wolf v. Fox, 178 Wis. 369, 190 N. W. 90 (1922).
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tery.ll Similarly, the parties may testify against each other 12 and all their
property is placed in statu quo ante.3
TAXATION-OIL LANDs-ImI UNrY OF FDERAL INSTRUMENTALTY-The
state of Oklahoma leased state oil lands to a private corporation. By the
terms of the lease the state received a certain percentage of the gross out-
put, the income from the sale of which was used for the benefit of public
schools. The entire income of the lessee corporation was derived from the
sale of its share of this output. In Burnet v. Coronado Oil and Gas Co.,'
the United States Supreme Court, by a vote of five to four, held invalid a
Federal income tax assessment levied upon this income, on the ground that
it constituted a burden upon the state in the performance of a governmental
function.
.The majority of the Court felt themselves bound by the previous decision
in Gillespie v. Oklahona,2 in which a state tax upon the income of Indian
oil lands was held to be invalid. The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Stone 3 advocated a reversal of the Gillespie case in view of the more recent
decision of the Court in Group No. 1 Oil Corporation v. Bass.' The situa-
tion there involved was identical with that in the instant ease but for the
fact that by the law of Texas title to minerals in situ passes to a lessee of
oil lands at once upon execution of the lease. In an opinion by Mr. Justice
Stone, this fact served to distinguish the Gillcspie case and the tax was
upheld. But as he himself points out in his present dissent, this distinc-
tion is purely dialectical, since the passage of title can have no bearing
upon the practical effect of the tax. Mr. Justice Brandeis, while concurring
in these views, suggested further z that in the application, as distinguished
from the interpretation of the Constitution, the doctrine of stare dccisi3
was not so inflexible as to preclude a determination of the instant case
upon consideration of its precise facts without a rigid adherence to appar-
ently controlling precedent. This seems to have been the technique adopted
by the Court in Willcuts v. Bunn 0 where a tax upon the profits from the
sale of government securities was upheld against the same objection on the
ground that it could have no practical effect upon the borrowing power of
the state. The attitude of the dissenters surely seems the more reasonable.
The doctrine of the imnunity of the federal instrumentality," born from
the burning issue of states' rights, can have but little significance to-day in
s Fox v. Dawson, 8 Mart. 94 (La. 1820); Sanders v. Ragan, 172 N. C.
612, 90 S. E. 777 (1916).
Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N. Y. 434 (1868); Morrill v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1,
33 At. 829 (1895).
10 Henneger v. Lomas, 145 Ind. 287, 44 N. E. 462 (189G).
n1 Blossom v. Barrett, supra note 9.
32 Wells v. Fletcher, 5 Car. & P. 12 (1831) ; BISHOP, op. cit. supra, note 3,
§ 689.
13 Coats v. Coats, 160 Cal. 671, 118 Pac. 441 (1911) ; Sellars v. Davis, 4
Yerg. 503 (Tenn. 1833); BisHop, op. cit. supra note 3, § 690.
I U. S. Daily, April 13, 1932, at 282.
2 257 U. S. 501, 42 Sup. Ct. 171 (1922).
3 Concurred in by Justices Brandeis, Cardozo, and Roberts.
4 283 U. S. 279, 51 Sup. Ct. 432 (1931).
5 Mr. Justice Cardozo did not concur in this opinion. Justices Stone and
Roberts did concur.
6282 U. S. 216, 51 Sup. Ct. 125 (1929).
It is interesting to note that both Canada and Australia which have
federal systems have refused to adopt tbe Federal instrumentality doctrine.
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the absence of a clear showing of discrimination against the sovereign's
agency or a material diminution of its power effectively to act.
TAx TITLE-DSTRUCTION OF MORTGAGE LIEN-A husband and wife jointly
executed a promissory note and mortgage upon land owned by the husband,
the wife joining in the execution of the mortgage for the purpose of re-
leasing her inchoate right of dower. When a subsequent purchaser failed
to pay taxes the land was sold to satisfy the indebtedness. After the death
of the husband the wife bought the land from the holder of the tax title
whereupon the mortgagee sued for judgment on the note and foreclosure
of the mortgage. The Iowa Court, four judges dissenting, rendered judg-
ment for the amount due upon the note but held that the tax sale had ex-
tinguished the lien of the mortgage.'
In most jurisdictions a purchaser at a sale of land for the non-paymont
of taxes acquires a fee simple title free from all incumbrances including
the lien of pre-existing mortgages.2 But a mortgagor, being under a duty
to pay the taxes and protect the mortgage title, cannot so extinguish the
lien 3 even though he regains the land from a remote purchaser at the tax
sale.4 In refusing to consider the wife a mortgagor in the instant case, the
court was apparently influenced by the ephemeral nature of the legal rela-
tions incident to an inchoate right of dower. Before the death of her
husband the wife has no vested estate but a mere possibility of one contin-
gent upon her survival,5 which cannot be assigned or released except by
joining with her husband in the conveyance of his land or in the execution
of a mortgage upon it.6 This has been held to be so slight an interest that
the legislature may abolish it 7 and condemnation proceedings extinguish
it,8 while its release to a grantee or mortgagee is regarded more as a
formality prerequisite to the marketability of real estate than as a sur-
render of a valuable right. If the state has seen fit to grant a new title
to land sold for taxes there seem to be no considerations of policy which
should place a wife under a disability to acquire it. A tax title obtained
for the purpose of defrauding a mortgagee does not operate to extinguish
the lien,'9 hence a collusive arrangement between husband and wife can be
nullified in a particular case without effecting a total disqualification based
upon an unsubstantial conception of inchoate dower.
I Wood v. Schwartz, 236 N. IV. 491 (Iowa, 1931).
2 Wagner v. Goodrich, 148 Md, 318, 129 Atl. 364 (1925). See Anderson
v. Dougherty, 169 Ky. 308, 312, 183 S. W. 545, 547 (1916); 9 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY (2d ed. 1920) § 557.
3 See Chamberlain v. Forbes, 126 Mich. 86, 90, 85 N. W. 253, 254 (1901).
4 Finch v. Noble, 49 Wash. 578, 96 Pac. 3 (1908).
5 Brannock v. Magoon. 216 Mo. 722, 116 S. W. 500 (1909). See Hey v.
Varner, 100 Va. 600, 602, 42 S. E. 690, 691 (1902).
6 Whithaus v. Schack, 105 N. Y. 322, 11 N. E. 649 (1887). See Schanz
v. Sotscheck, 167 App. Div. 202, 213, 152 N. Y. Supp. 851, 860 (1st Dep't
1915).
7 See Ferry v. Spokane, 258 U. S. 314, 42 Sup. Ct. 358, 359 (1922).
8 Long v. Long, 99 Ohio St. 330, 124 N. E. 161 (1919).
9 McAlpin v. Zitser, 119 Ill. 273, 10 N. E. 901 (1887).
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